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(WHEN) DO THEY JUSTIFY MANDATORY DISCLOSURE?
Sharon Hannes*
Abstract
Comparisons among firms play a major role in securities analysis.  This 
essay asks if this fact justifies the mandatory nature of securities regulation.  Once 
a firm approaches the public securities markets, federal securities regulations 
compel it to disclose financial information to the public.  A seminal theory argues 
that firms would not otherwise commit to maintain optimal disclosure levels, since 
a disclosing firm bears all disclosure costs but does not gain all disclosure benefits.  
This paper examines the robustness of this argument in relation to disclosure 
benefits which arise from comparisons among firms.  Financial data of peer firms 
allows shareholders to measure and monitor the relative performance of their own 
firm. The ability to makes such comparisons is a benefit that each disclosing firm 
provides to its peers; it may have great social value but allegedly no private value 
to the disclosing party which bears the full cost of such disclosure. One might, 
therefore, call to address this market failure with a mandatory disclosure 
requirement.
Interestingly, while the above description might justify a mandatory 
disclosure requirement for private firms (a requirement which does not exist in 
practice), it does not automatically justify mandated disclosure by public firms. If 
comparison benefits accrue only after the public shareholders or securities analysts 
have had a chance to review the data of all the relevant firms (which is the case for 
all public firms), then each individual firm cannot enjoy comparison benefits 
without exposing its own statements. In other words, if one firm must make its 
financials public in order to incur comparative disclosure benefits -- which is 
normally the case with public firms since their public investors process financial 
data outside the boundaries of the firm -- then public firms would tend to disclose 
information regardless of the fact that such information benefits their peers.  This 
voluntary mutual disclosure phenomenon, which helps firms capture comparative 
disclosure benefits, mitigates the fear that disclosure might be sub-optimally 
produced without the intervention of the regulator. Nevertheless, if a material piece 
of information confers significant comparative benefits when reviewed by 
corporate insiders and not by the public shareholders, then one cannot count on 
voluntary mutual disclosure to occur, and the mandatory federal intervention might 
be in order.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
The justifications for the mandatory nature of the federal securities disclosure 
regulation have been thoroughly examined in the literature, during a long lasting debate 
which has recently reignited.1  Interestingly, the often-praised properties of the federal 
disclosure system cannot easily serve as a justification for its mandatory nature.2  Simply 
put, if the regime governed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“S.E.C.”) 
benefits the shareholders of a given firm, then such a firm would opt for this regime when 
going public, since it would maximize the value of its shares.  To compel firms to adopt 
the disclosure regulation is unnecessary.
This notion is part of the now classical view that pre-IPO shareholders will either 
commit to optimal corporate governance terms at the stage of the public offering, or else 
the market will penalize them with a discount on the value of their shares.3  This 
hypothesized voluntary commitment to adopt the S.E.C. regulation, if it is indeed 
1 Romano proposes that the current mandatory system of federal securities law be replaced by a 
system of issuer choice, while Fox argues that the current mandatory framework must be retained.  See
Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J.
2359, 2361-62 (1998); Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is 
not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999); Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in 
International Securities regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 387 (2001); Merritt B. Fox, 
The Issuer Choice Debate, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 563 (2001).
2 In the literature, the success of the U.S. capital markets is often attributed to extensive S.E.C. 
disclosure regulation.  See, e.g., Michael H. Sutton, Financial Reporting in U.S. Capital Markets: 
International Dimensions, 11 ACCOUNTING HORIZONS 96-102 (1997); Arthur Levitt, The Importance 
of High Quality Accounting Standards, 12 ACCOUNTING HORIZONS 79-82 (1998). As expressed by 
one commentator:  “The introduction of disclosure regulation can potentially provide a solution of the 
lemons problem.  If the law requires companies that go public to provide a wide range of information, it 
will become easier for investors to distinguish high-quality companies from their less meritorious 
counterparts.”  Brian R. Cheffins, DOES LAW MATTER? THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN 
THE UNITED KINGDOM, (ERSC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Working Paper 
No. 172, 2000) page 9, at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=245560.
3
 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structures, 4 J. FIN. ECON. 305-360 (1976).
3optimal, also allows us to disregard distorted managerial interests of mature firms that 
might lead firms to leave the S.E.C. system or refrain from adopting its ever-changing 
features.  Even in the absence of mandated disclosure, the incorporation documents could 
simply state that once committed to the S.E.C. system in the IPO, managers and directors 
must adhere to the disclosure regulation system thereafter.
Against the backdrop of such an optimistic understanding, Frank H. Easterbrook 
and Daniel R. Fischel pointed out long ago a seemingly persuasive argument in favor of 
the mandatory nature of our disclosure system.4  As they laconically explained, securities 
disclosure entails externalities, i.e. a disclosing firm benefits its peer firms, and not only 
its own investors.  Given the fact that the disclosing party endures all costs of disclosure 
but does not absorb all of its benefits, actual disclosure levels may fall below the socially 
optimal ones.  While others have recently adopted this line of argument, no one clearly 
identified which aspects of disclosure benefit peer firms, causing the mischief in the first 
place.5  This gap calls for a response, particularly because evidence for such an enigmatic 
benefit was recently revealed by an empirical study. This study suggests that an 
expansion in the coverage of the S.E.C. disclosure requirements that occurred in 1999 
benefited firms that were already filing with the S.E.C. prior to the rule change and were 
peer firms of the newly compliant ones.6
4 The paper elaborates on this view below.  Infra Part II.
5 The financial literature points out that positive externalities could result from informational or 
liquidity spillovers due to increased disclosure by other firms.  See, Ronald A. Dye, Mandatory versus 
Voluntary Disclosure: The Cases of Financial and Real Externalities, 65 ACCT. REV. 1-24 (1990); Anat R 
Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure Regulation and Externalities, 13 
REV. FIN. STUD. 479-519 (2000).  In this paper we emphasize informational spillovers.
6 The study examines the economic consequences of S.E.C disclosure requirements using a recent 
regulatory change in the OTC Bulletin Board, an electronic quotation medium operated by the National 
Association of Securities Dealers.  Starting in 1999, all firms trading on the OTC Bulletin Board have to 
comply with the "eligibility rule" requiring firms to provide S.E.C disclosure filings.  Some of the OTC 
Bulletin Board firms had not filed with the S.E.C prior to this change in regulation while others already had 
4One possible benefit that disclosure provides peer firms is the revelation of 
sensitive business information.  As Roberta Romano justifiably argues, however, such a 
benefit cannot serve as a proper justification for the nature of our regulation system, 
which is doing its best to minimize exposure of business secrets.7  Revelation of business 
secrets is considered a harmful byproduct of disclosure, rather than a desirable goal.
This paper therefore underscores a different aspect of disclosure which creates --
inter-firm spillovers (or externalities); the ability to compare other firms to the disclosing 
party.  Comparisons of financial information among peer firms, also known as cross 
section analysis, lie at the core of all securities analyses, and are vital to the efficiency of 
our capital markets.  The importance of such comparisons is stressed repeatedly 
throughout the literature of financial statements analysis.  Clyde Stickney and Roman 
Weil, for example, in their famous intermediate level book on financial accounting, 
describe the importance of comparisons as follows: 
Readers cannot easily answer questions about a firm’s 
profitability and risk from the raw information in financial 
statements… Ratios aid financial statement analysis because 
they conveniently summarize data… [but] Ratios, by 
themselves out of context, provide little information. For 
example, does a rate of return on common shareholders’ equity 
of 8.6 percent indicate satisfactory performance? After 
(the prior threshold for disclosure was total assets exceeding $10 million and more than 500 shareholders). 
Hence it was possible to isolate and measure the consequences of the disclosure on peer firms.  See Brian J. 
Bushee & Christian Leuz, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF SEC DISCLOSURE REGULATION: EVIDENCE FROM 
THE OTC BULLETIN BOARD (2002), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=307821.
7 Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, supra note 1, at 
2368.  Reg S-K contains provisions that exempt firms from disclosure that may expose business secrets.
5calculating the ratios the analyst must compare them with some 
standard… [such as] the corresponding ratio for a similar firm 
in the industry…[or] the average ratio for other firms in the 
same industry.8
This comparative advantage of disclosure, however, was never emphasized by the 
legal scholarship that dealt with the mandatory disclosure system.  The absence of an 
inquiry into the nature of these benefits is odd, since at a first glance the comparative 
benefits of disclosure, if they are indeed essential for the welfare of the capital markets, 
seem like a good justification for mandated disclosure.  
Surprisingly, however, this feature of disclosure, and the reality that most 
financial data disclosed by one firm indeed benefits its peers, does not automatically 
necessitate the mandatory nature of the federal system.  Nevertheless, this paper shows 
that the use of financial comparisons may support calls for mandatory securities 
regulation in certain circumstances.
The crux of the argument is to differentiate between comparison benefits reaped 
directly by the public shareholders of a given firm (or other “outsiders”), from those 
primarily enjoyed by corporate insiders (and only indirectly by the public shareholders).  
While both types of comparison benefits enhance the value of the firm, only the former is 
likely to instigate voluntary disclosure; the latter may  require mandatory intervention of 
8 Clyde P. Stickney & Roman L. Weil, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING (10th ed., 2003) 249. See also
Gerald L. White, Ashwinpaul C. Sondhi & Dov Fried, THE ANALYSIS AND USE OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
(3rd ed. 2003), 111; Jerry J. Weygandt, Donald E. Kiesso & Paul D. Kimmel, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTING (6th ed. 2002).
6the regulator.9  To illustrate this argument, one can take advantage of the roles that 
financial comparisons play in two fields of accounting: financial accounting and 
managerial accounting.
Financial accounting is the branch of accounting which presents financial data to 
recipients outside the firm.  Such recipients might include, for example, a bank that is 
reviewing the financial condition of the company in order to assess the merits of a loan 
request, or public shareholders (usually through a securities analyst) who are reviewing 
the firm to determine its value.  Since the recipients of the information are outsiders, it is 
only understandable that clear and binding auditing and reporting standards have 
crystallized over the years.  This enables outsiders to process reliable information in a 
standard fashion.  Within this framework, comparisons among firms are highly important.  
Analysts, for example, are trained to ascertain if a firm is competitive and adheres to 
industry standards by comparing the firm’s financial ratios with those of its peers.10
The logic behind financial comparisons is twofold.  First, financial data such as 
inventory levels must be compared with industry standards to ascertain that they are not 
sub-optimal.  What might appear to be a reasonable inventory level, may be shown to be 
too small or too large when compared to rival firms.  Hence, financial data has a 
9 Comparison to another firm may support or hurt the share price of the firm ex post, but ex ante the 
ability to compare is a benefit since it reduces information asymmetries between the firm and its monitors, 
which in turn allows better monitoring, and therefore higher share value and liquidity.
10 A ratio expresses the mathematical relationship between one quantity and another taken out of the 
financial statements of the relevant firm.  The relationship is expressed in terms of either a percentage, a 
rate, or a simple proportions.    The comparison between the ratios of the examined firm and its peers 
assists analysts in assessing the firm’s competence.  Often used financial ratios measures liquidity levels 
(the Current Ratio, the Acid-test (Quick) Ratio, the Current Cash Debt Coverage Ratio, Receivables 
Turnover and Inventory Turnover), profitability levels (the Profit Margin, the Cash Return on Sales, the 
Asset Turnover, Return on Assets, Return on Equity, Earning Per Share, Price-Earning Ratio and the 
Payout Ratio) and susceptibility for insolvency (Debt to Total Assets Ratio, Times Interest Earned Ratio 
and the Cash Flow from Operations to Liabilities Ratio). See, Stickney & Weil, supra note 8, at 278; 
Weygandt Et. Al, supra note 8at 803. For a recent study of the precision of different ratios (multiples) see
Eric Lie & Heidi Lie, Multiples Used to Estimate Corporate Value, 58 FIN. ANAL. J. 44-54 (2002).
7comparative aspect on top of its intrinsic value. (Even the cash article in the financial 
reports, which seems to have such an obvious intrinsic value, may point to a problem 
when compared to other firms).11
Second, financial results, such as sales or profits, must be compared among firms 
in order to determine if the results are the product of managerial efforts rather then a 
trend in the economy. A hefty rise in sales disclosed by one company does not insure that 
the firm is operating effectively, if, for example, financial reports of its peers show that 
they did much better.  Conversely, a fall in sales may still indicate competent 
management, if comparisons show that opponent firms did worse during the same period.
This paper demonstrates, however, that the leading role of comparisons in 
financial accounting -- a salient externality of securities disclosures -- does not generally 
justify the mandatory nature of securities disclosure for public firms.  The essence of the 
argument is that mutual disclosure is necessary in order for one firm to absorb the 
benefits resulting from disclosure by other firms.  In order for the public shareholders or 
the securities analyst to compare the data of all relevant firms, such relevant firms must 
first disclose their own reports, since financial data is processed outside the firm.  To put 
it another way, although disclosure benefits other firms, each individual firm must 
disclose its own data in order to enjoy the benefits of the disclosure of other firms.  Thus, 
the externalities that financial accounting involves should not necessarily impede 
voluntary commitment to socially optimal levels of disclosure (and if the S.E.C. 
regulations reflect such socially optimal levels, then firms would elect to follow them 
when going public).
11 Jensen argues that firms which enjoy a hefty cash flow not committed to an efficient cause are 
prone to waste it to the detriment of the public shareholders.  See, Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free 
Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1986).
8This is not the case with disclosure aspects that are relevant for managerial 
accounting.  Managerial accounting is the accounting branch that provides financial 
information for corporate insiders.  While there is usually no need to use external auditors 
for the work, since credibility is not the major problem within the firm, there is a great 
similarity to financial accounting in the need to gather and analyze the financial 
information of other firms.  Similar questions trouble corporate insiders and outsiders –
how well is the firm operating, and what is required to improve performance.
It is no surprise that managers (the primal insider consumer of information) rely 
heavily on comparisons to other firms, just as outsiders do in relation to financial 
accounting data.  Again, comparisons are done primarily for two reasons.  First, because 
industry standards and habits are important for the managerial team; managers must 
assess if the deviations of their firm from such standards are justified. Second, 
comparisons are made to verify if the results of operations are the consequence of market 
conditions or managerial performance. Comparisons, therefore, are used intensively as an 
integral part of any managerial accounting assessment.
Note however, that the benefits gained by a firm from a managerial accounting
perspective can be achieved without exposing its own financial statements to the public.  
Unlike the efforts of securities analysts, which necessitate mutual disclosure, managers of 
a firm can enjoy benefits arising from the financial statements of other firms without 
disclosing their own reports.  Considering this, and the potentially high costs of 
disclosure, it is plausible to assume that efficient disclosure levels would not be adopted 
voluntarily.  In such a scenario, a mandatory securities regulation regime might improve 
the position of all firms, although each one of them would opt out of the disclosure 
9regime if it were allowed to do so.  In other words, the threat of a free ride on the 
disclosure efforts of others might justify the mandatory nature of our securities system, or 
at least, certain parts of it.
 Part  II of this article briefly presents the debate in the literature, focusing on the 
argument raised by this paper.  Part III considers the motivations for voluntary disclosure 
when data is processed outside the firm, providing relevant examples.  Part IV discusses 
justifications for mandatory disclosure when financial data is processed within the firm.  
Part V explores how the analysis may explain another enigma related to securities 
disclosure – the mandatory requirement made by Blue Sky laws for firms to disclose 
financial information at the time of going public, but not thereafter.  Section VI concludes 
by evaluating the robustness of the justification for a mandatory disclosure system and 
compares it with private solutions to the challenge.
II. THE DEBATE IN THE LITERATURE
The traditional rationale for the mandatory nature of the federal disclosure system 
is the assertion that information is a public good that permits a “free ride” for users who 
have not paid for it.12 Due to this characteristic of information, and in the absence of 
mandatory disclosure, the argument goes, there would be suboptimal level of securities 
disclosure.13  The S.E.C. attempts to determine the requisite amount and nature of 
12 William H. Beaver, The Nature of Mandated Disclosure, in ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW 
AND SECURITIES REGULATION 317, 320 (Richard A. Posner & Kenneth E. Scott eds., 1980); Frank H. 
Easterbook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV.
669, 681 (1984); John C. Coffee Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure 
System, 70 VA. L. REV 717, 725 (1984).
13 On the one hand, too little disclosure may result from the fact that private information almost 
instantly dissipates in the market so that the collector of information cannot reap the full value of his 
investment in disclosure.  On the other hand, excessive search for information may also occur, since market 
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corporate disclosure that would take place, absent the inefficiencies described above, and 
impose them on public firms.14
Another major traditional argument in favor of disclosure regulation suggests that 
in the absence of regulation, market forces would lead to an uneven possession of 
information among investors, which in turn would harm investors’ confidence in the 
capital markets. It is only fair (and efficient) therefore, that the less informed be protected 
from the more informed.15 The S.E.C disclosure regulations solve the problem by 
reducing the benefit of private search of information. The S.E.C. preempts private search 
by mandating disclosure and by imposing legal liability on selective transmittal of 
information.16
Another common argument for disclosure regulation is that management has 
incentives to suppress unfavorable information, to withhold adverse information and to 
undertake preemptive buyouts of its own firm. As a result, investors will not have 
sufficient data concerning the market and will be unable to distinguish quality differences 
among traded firms.17 A mandatory disclosure system would reduce such agency costs of 
corporate governance.18
participants may gain from trades based on private information that has no social value (such as duplicated 
information), and therefore, any investment in its collection is a social waste.
14 Beaver, supra note 12.
15 From an efficiency point of view, the claim may be phrased as follows: Excessive search for 
information stems from private gains that market participants may capture if they trade shares with non-
public information. Mandated disclosure,  the argument goes, may alleviate this problem since disclosure 
minimizes opportunities for these private gains.  Coffee, supra note 12, at 734.
16 Beaver, supra note 12, at 323; Coffee, supra note 12, at 726; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 
12, at 692.
17 Beaver, supra note 12, at 325; Coffee, supra note 12, at 739.
18 It may also be argued that the investment in developing the optimal standard of disclosure requires 
a federal body.  Since disclosure standards are complex and expensive to develop and update, and since the 
standard is a public good that anyone can duplicate once others develop it, there may be a need for a public 
entity such as the S.E.C. to govern it.  While this may or may not justify the existence and function of the 
S.E.C. it cannot justify compelling the standard.  If the standard is expensive to develop, private actors may 
arguably not form it, but once it is publicly available, firms should be free to opt out of the public 
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Easterbook and Fischel are not persuaded by these arguments.  First, Easterbrook 
and Fischel have criticized the arguments on the basis that the S.E.C. does not solve the 
problems raised.  Some of the “disclosure” rules, for instance, prohibit the transmission 
of certain information, such as forward-looking statements, and therefore cannot be 
justified by the arguments above.  In addition, there is no evidence that mandatory 
disclosure rules actually protect unsophisticated investors.19
 Second, and more importantly, firms should be able to solve the above problems 
even when disclosure is voluntary.20 The firm, Easterbrook and Fischel assert, is in 
privity with its investors, and as the Coase Theorem suggests,  the firm and the investors 
can strike a mutually beneficial bargain. Once the firm starts making disclosures, it 
cannot stop short of any particular critical revelation, because investors always assume 
the worst.  Moreover, the firm may commit to continuous disclosure at the stage it goes 
public.  The legal system should then enforce such commitment instead of mandating it.  
A firm that wants the highest possible price when it issues stock must take all cost-
justified steps to make the stock valuable in the aftermarket, including credible pledges to 
continue disclosing.21
Edward Rock highlights the importance of the credible commitment to disclose, 
arguing that the U.S. disclosure regime permits issuers to make such credible 
commitment for permanent disclosure.22 This ability to commit credibly facilitates 
arrangement if they so desire.  Put differently, an efficient standard would be voluntarily adopted by all 
firms that favor it.  
19 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12, at 693.
20 Ibid., at 682.
21 Ibid., at 684.
22 Edward Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible Theory of Mandatory 
Disclosure, 23 CADOZO L. REV. 675 (2002).
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contractual relations between the issuers and investors, thereby reducing the cost of 
capital.23  The U.S. disclosure system demands a high level of disclosure, with severe 
sanctions for inaccurate disclosure. Combined with the difficulty of opting out of the 
system, this serves as the requisite commitment to provide high quality disclosure into the 
indefinite future.24  Rock admits, however, that this does not justify forcing firms into the 
system, and argues that firms would voluntarily opt into the system if it were not 
mandated.
John C. Coffee, Jr. has criticized this point of view, contending that voluntary 
disclosure overlooks the significance of corporate control transactions and much too 
facilely assumes that manager and shareholder interests can be perfectly aligned.25 This 
view is highly debatable, since it may justify almost any intervention in the operation of 
our capital markets while the stated principal that guides the regulation is that anyone 
willing to disclose may sell securities at whatever price the market will sustain.. 
Interestingly, Easterbrook and Fischel themselves raise the strongest pro 
mandatory argument, and finally leave the issue of the optimal disclosure regime open. 
They conclude that rules of disclosure may be beneficial in ways that require further 
understanding, but one cannot be confident that the current disclosure regime is the 
optimal one, or that it is better than a voluntary disclosure alternative.26
23 Rock justifiably argues that standards of disclosure should be coordinated among firms to achieve 
their full value.  Rock, supra note 22, at 686.  While this coordination argument is fully acceptable, it can 
hardly justify the mandatory nature of securities regulation today.  Since this paper does not propose to 
abolish the federal system, and since all firms currently use the same securities disclosure system, the fear 
is that standardization would lead firms to opt for the federal system even if it is sub-optimal.  The opposite 
fear, that coordination would be disrupted by the lack of a single disclosure system, does not hold, 
following the coordination achieved through decades of mandated adherence to the federal regulation.
24 Rock, supra note 22, at 687.
25 Coffee, supra note 12, at 738.  Coffee also argued that the beneficiaries of increased efficiency 
include virtually all members of society, and not just investors.  Ibid, at 736.
26 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12, at 685. 
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Easterbrook and Fischel’s argument for the mandatory nature of the disclosure 
system is based on inter-firm benefits (or externalities), rather than the traditional 
argument, which highlights the benefits of disclosure to the investors of the disclosing 
entity.  They argue that an imposition of a standard format of disclosure facilitates an 
efficient disclosure language and that firms would enjoy reciprocal benefits from such 
disclosure.27 In their own words:
The information produced by one firm for its investors may be 
valuable to investors of other firms. Firm A’s statements may reveal 
something about the industry in which firm A operates – if only the 
size of firm A’s anticipated production – that other participants in the 
industry can use in planning their operations. There may be other 
collateral benefits to investors in rival firms. Yet firm A cannot 
charge the investors in these other firms for the benefits, although 
they would be willing to pay for then. Because they cannot be 
charged, the information will be underproduced.28
By the mid 1980s, the debate largely died out, and mandatory disclosure was 
retained.  The debate was reignited after Romano proposed to implement state 
competition in securities regulation, in which firms would select their securities regulator 
from among the fifty states, the S.E.C. or other nations, all of whom would stand on equal 
regulatory footing.29 Romano emphasizes that a theoretical need for government 
27 Easterbrook & Fischel, ibid., at 700.
28 Frank H. Easterbook & Daniel R. Fischel, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
(1991) 250.
29
  Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, supra note 1.  Choi & 
Guzman have proposed essentially the same reform, although their emphasis was on the issuer’s choice of 
the best suitable regime, rather than on the investors’ benefits.  See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, 
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regulation to prevent a market failure is not equivalent to a need for a monopolist 
regulator. Competitive federalism, as she claims, harnesses the high-powered incentives 
of markets to produce regulatory arrangements compatible with investors’ preferences.30
Further on, Romano refutes the inter-firm externality or benefit argument.31 The 
majority of investors, she states, hold portfolios composed of many firms, and therefore, 
unlike the single issuer, they desire a regime requiring optimal information disclosure; 
their position in multiple firms allows them to gain a great deal of the inter-firm benefit 
of disclosure.
In a critical article, Merritt B. Fox  tries to negate this claim, and argues that an 
investor can enjoy most of the benefits of diversification by holding only a few stocks.32
Contrary to a monopolist government entity, such investors would not have an 
opportunity to balance the competitive disadvantage of the disclosure with the benefit of 
disclosure to other firms.  In response to this article, Romano stresses that Fox’s concern 
is mitigated by the fact that a majority of shareholders are large institutions which hold 
portfolios of many firms and would therefore be able to internalize much of the costs and 
benefits of disclosures. 33
Naturally, Romano stresses the benefits of her proposed regime, noting that in a 
competitive regulatory system, undesirable mandatory policies cannot be maintained over 
time.  Firms would migrate to a regulatory regime , which did not impose such inefficient 
Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV.
903 (1998). 
30 Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, supra note 1, at 
2365.
31 Romano, ibid., at 2369
32 Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is not Investor 
Empowerment, supra note 1. 
33 Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, supra note 1. 
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mandates.34 Many regulatory mistakes that are being caused by misunderstanding 
investors’ needs would become far less likely. In addition, the state competition regime 
permits experimentation in legal rules, since states would implement different solutions 
to specific problems, which in turn would lead to a more rapid updating of less-than-
optimal regulation. 35
Fox argues that despite the apparent attractions of Romano’s approach, the issuer 
choice proposal should be rejected.36 Giving the issuers the right to choose their 
disclosure regime would likely decrease, not increase, U.S. economic welfare; such a 
regime would lead issuers to elect disclosure levels significantly below the social 
optimum.  Like Easterbrook and Fischel, Fox focuses on the inter-firm costs of 
disclosure, which arise because the information provided can put the issuer at a 
disadvantage relative to the issuer’s competitors. He asserts that at all levels of disclosure, 
an issuer’s private marginal costs will exceed the issuer’s social marginal cost by an 
amount equal to these inter-firm costs.37 This divergence of private from social costs 
means that the issuer’s choice will lead to a market failure. Instead of the states 
competition regime, Fox proposes to ameliorate the existing system by accommodating 
the different needs of different types of issuers.38
In response, Romano claims that in practice, the S.E.C.’s mandated disclosure 
does not and cannot require firms to disclose private proprietary information in order for 
the released information to significantly assist competitors and support the inter-firm 
34
 Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation supra note 1, at 
2373.
35 Ibid., at 2392.
36
 Fox, ibid., supra note 1, at 1337.
37
 Fox, ibid., at 1345.
38 Fox, ibid., at 1408.
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rationale. , Any real benefits to competitors from the mandated disclosure, Romano 
continues, are either accidental or trivial. 
Against the backdrop of this debate, this paper asks whether inter-firm benefits or 
externalities can justify prohibition of opting out of the S.E.C. disclosure regime at the 
IPO stage.  The paper concentrates on a single and salient type of such externalities -- the 
benefit of comparisons -- which has not received sufficient attention in the literature.  
Romano’s argument that investors with diversified portfolios would mitigate 
problems of inter-firms externalities does not work well for comparison benefits.  
Diversified portfolios do not normally contain stock of many competitors in the same 
market segment (whose market risk is naturally highly correlated), while inter-firm 
benefits of comparisons are most salient between firms in the same line of business.   
Nevertheless, as the analysis will illustrate, the mere existence of significant comparison 
benefits does not automatically necessitate a mandatory disclosure regime.
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III. MOTIVATIONS FOR VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE WHEN DATA IS PROCESSED 
OUTSIDE THE FIRM  
Even in the absence of a mandatory disclosure requirement, public firms would 
commit to a certain level of disclosure, as they did prior to the legislation of the federal 
securities laws.39  Without releasing information to the public domain, public firms would 
not be able to attract public investors, nor could they sustain a market price for their 
securities.  However, as described above, comparison benefits that the disclosing firm  
provides its peers may cause disclosure levels to fall short of the socially optimal level, 
since the firm that bears the costs of disclosure does not absorb all disclosure benefits.  
This externality that financial disclosure entails may justify a mandatory disclosure 
regime, only if the costs of disclosure are higher than the benefits of disclosure for the 
disclosing firm, but fall short of the total disclosure benefits (for the disclosing firm and 
its peers).  This twofold condition warrants mandatory intervention, so the argument 
goes, since, on the one hand, it means that firms may not voluntarily opt for disclosure, 
while on the other hand, it insures that disclosure is beneficial for society.
Surprisingly, the reciprocal nature of the disclosure externality may bring about 
voluntary disclosure, even when the twofold condition is met.40  Before the paper 
continues to illustrate the interaction among firms that contributes to voluntary 
disclosure, it is useful to consider two real life examples of comparative (or cross section) 
analysis.  The first is an example of an analysis of the current ratio, which is a frequently 
used measure of liquidity.  The current ratio (or the working capital ratio) is computed by 
39 Economic theory suggests that an increased commitment to disclosure reduces information 
asymmetry and increases market liquidity.  Each firm, however, would balance these benefits with the costs 
of disclosure, which include revelation of sensitive information, the risk of being sued and high 
administrative costs.  See, Robert E. Verrecchia, Essays on Disclosure, 32 J. ACCT. ECON. 91-180 (2001). 
40 This means that the twofold condition for mandatory intervention is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for mandatory treatment.
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dividing current assets by current liabilities.  The higher the current ratio the less chance 
there is that the corporation shall suffer from liquidity problems.  To understand how this 
ratio is used let as look at the ratios of a small department stores’ corporation by the name 
of Quality Department Store.41 The 1999 current ratio of this firm was 2.91, which means 
that for every dollar of current liabilities, Quality had $2.96 dollars of current assets. The 
ratio for 1998 was higher and stood on 3.1. Quality’s current ratio has decreased during 
the year, but this does not mean necessarily that Quality is nearing liquidity problems.  A 
comparative review is in order.  For instance, the current ratio for 1999 of Sears, 
Roebuck, and Co., a significant industry player, was 2.09,42 and the industry average was 
1.25. Altogether, it seems that liquidity should not be a top concern of a reviewer of 
Quality. 
The second example is the one of the inventory turnover ratio. The inventory 
turnover measures the number of times on average the inventory is sold during the period.  
Its purpose is to measure the liquidity of the inventory and it may also be indicative of 
problems of obsolete inventory, which the corporation insists not to write off.  Using 
Quality Department Store’s financial information one may compute that Quality’s 
inventory turnover was 2.4 in 1998 and 2.3 in 1999.  Generally, the faster (i.e, the higher) 
the inventory turnover, the less cash that is tied up in the inventory and the less chance of 
inventory obsolescence. But, Quality’s inventory turnover by itself does not reveal if it is 
fast enough and the analyst must use comparative information to make an exacting 
41 To illustrate that comparative analysis is an integral part of financial statements’ analysis, the 
example is taken from a commonly used textbook for introductory courses in accounting.  See, Weygandt 
Et. al., Supra note 8, at 782-90. 
42 Note that the ratio technique allows to draw comparative conclusions even though Sear’s net 1999 
sales were 19,585 times greater than the net sales of the relatively tiny Quality Department Store, and 
Sears; net income was more than 5,500 times larger than Quality’s.
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assessment.  It turns out that the industry average in 1999 was 6.2 and Sears, Roebuck 
and Co. had a inventory turnover of 5.14.  Only after conducting such cross section 
analysis may the analyst expose that Quality does not seem particularly efficient in this 
category.
  Aside from emphasizing the importance of comparisons for securities analysis, 
the two examples also illustrated a simple fact.  The analyst could not reach any 
comparative conclusion unless she had possession of the financial information of all 
relevant firms.  As mentioned above, the consumers of information in the financial 
accounting paradigm are corporate outsiders, and primarily public shareholders.  If a firm 
wants to please its investors with the benefits of disclosure of peer firms, it cannot hope 
to enjoy these disclosures without exposing its own reports to the public.  For the public 
shareholder (or the securities analyst) to compare the financial data of different firms, she 
must hold all relevant financial reports in her hands.
To appreciate the financial accounting disclosure argument, consider the 
following scenario.  Let us assume that at the level mandated by the S.E.C. regulations, 
the costs of disclosure, are 5, and the intrinsic benefits of disclosure (i.e. the benefits that 
accrue to the disclosing party without comparisons to other firms) are 4.43  Each 
disclosing party, however, confers a benefit of 3 on its peer, since the peer benefits from 
the ability to compare its own financial information with the disclosed information.  This 
43 While the costs of disclosure stem from many sources, including revelation of business secrets and 
other sensitive information, consumption of managerial time, the threat of frivolous suits and administrative 
costs, there is very little empirical evidence regarding the costs and benefits of the securities regulation.  
One study mentions that this type of empirical study is “virtually non-existent”.  See, Paul M. Healy and 
Krishna Palepu, Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A Review of the 
Empirical Disclosure Literature, 31 J. ACCT. ECON. 405-440 (2001).  One famous exception is the 
Benston study on the benefits of the Securities Exchange Act 1934, which concludes that the disclosure 
statutes were of no apparent value to investors.  See, George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock 
Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV ., 132-155 (1973).
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scenario is presented in the following 2 X 2 matrix, delineating the logic of reciprocal 
comparison benefits when financial data is processed outside the firm:
Firm A
Disclose     Non-Disclose
Firm B Disclose 2, 2 -1,0
Non-Disclose 0,-1  0,0
The southwest and northeast corners of the matrix represent instances in which 
one party opts for disclosure while the other refrains from disclosure.  The non-disclosing 
party bears no costs and accrues no benefits, while the disclosing party bears the cost of 
5, while enjoying a benefit of only 4, since its disclosed information cannot be compared 
(leading to a total loss of 1).  Note that the non-disclosing party cannot enjoy the benefits 
of comparison to the disclosing party, since comparison analysis must be done outside of 
the firm.  If, however, both firms commit to the disclosure regime, they will each enjoy 
disclosure benefits of 7, including benefits resulting from the disclosure by the rival firm, 
while they bear a cost of only 5 (resulting in a total gain of 2).
Two equilibriums (pure strategies “Nash Equilibria”) emerge from the game.44
Either both parties disclose (and gain 2 each) or both parties reject the disclosure levels 
proposed by the S.E.C. (and gain nothing).45  Put differently, there is no reason to 
disclose if the other party does not disclose, and there is much sense in disclosure if the 
other party discloses.  Note that out of the two possible outcomes, there is reason to 
44 The concept “equilibrium” in game theory means that each player is using a strategy that is the 
best response to the strategies of other players.  See, e.g., Avinash Dixit & Susan Skeath, GAMES OF 
STRATEGY (1999) 30.
45 As explained above, public firms would always commit to some level of disclosure. Assuming that 
the S.E.C. proposed levels are the socially optimal ones, such levels may not be adopted voluntarily by the 
firms.
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believe that the superior outcome (mutual voluntary disclosure) would prevail.  If the 
scenario depicted above resembles reality, i.e., if the S.E.C. -mandated regime is highly 
beneficial when most firms commit to it, then it is likely that most  firms would opt for 
the regime even if it becomes voluntary.  The long lasting adherence to the S.E.C. 
regulations mandated in the last seven decades, creates a focal point, and if such an 
equilibrium is indeed superior to the equilibrium in which all firms decide not to disclose, 
then it is highly unlikely that all firms would opt out of the disclosure system even if they 
were allowed to do so.46
The conclusion of our discussion so far is that the mere fact that externalities exist 
-- particularly when externalities flow from the ability to compare financial accounting 
information among firms -- does not warrant mandatory securities regulation.  One may 
also imagine a scenario, however, in which heterogeneous firms with different levels of 
disclosure costs and benefits, may alter our previous conclusions.  Consider the following 
example; assume that firm A does not benefit from comparisons to its rival, but firm B 
gains a great deal from comparisons to its rival as shown in the following matrix:
46 Another reason that most firms, which currently disclose will not opt out of the system is that 
disclosure has significant initiation costs. Once a firm already abides by the disclosure regime it is easier to 
persuade it to keep on doing so voluntarily.  This issue is discussed in section 5 of the paper.
In any case, this paper concentrates on the decision of firms to commit to the S.E.C. regime at the 
time they go public.  Mature firms, especially those with dispersed ownership, suffer from a severe agency 
problem that may impede a commitment to adopt the disclosure regulation, even if such a decision 
enhances the welfare of the shareholders.  Therefore, even if the conclusion is reached that there is no 
reason to have a mandatory securities regulation, it does not follow that public firms should have the right 
to opt out of the disclosure regime they are now under.  And if mature firms remain under the disclosure 
regime, it makes all the more sense for firms that go public to adopt the same commitment, if indeed the 
equilibrium in which all firms disclose is optimal. 
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A
Disclose     Non-Disclose
B Disclose 2, -1  -1,0
Non-Disclose 0,-1  0,0
In this matrix, firm A has a dominant strategy of non-disclosure.  Since it does not 
enjoy any benefits from financial comparisons, and its costs of disclosure are evidently 
higher than the intrinsic benefits it will gain from disclosure, firm A will refrain from 
disclosure regardless of the decision of firm B.  Contrarily, firm B benefits significantly 
from financial comparisons (although its intrinsic disclosure benefits are lower than its 
disclosure costs).47  Consequently, firm B will opt for the disclosure strategy if firm A 
discloses (Northwest corner) but not if firm A chooses not to disclose (Southeast corner).  
Since firm A will definitely not disclose, the sole equilibrium is the one in which no one 
discloses.  
Under the circumstances of the example above, it is clear that a mandated 
disclosure system (leading to the Northwest solution) would improve social welfare.  The 
net disclosure benefits of firm B (2) compensates for the loss of firm A (-1).  If one 
believes, therefore, that the depiction above resembles the real world, mandatory 
disclosure may enhance social welfare.48  The truth probably lies somewhere in the 
middle.  This means that the reciprocal nature of comparative benefits mitigate the 
market failure associated with disclosure spillovers but do not solve it entirely.  
47 This scenario resembles another externality that financial disclosure entails, i.e., the revelation of 
trade secrets.  If financial reports expose trade secrets, and if peer firms benefit from this externality more 
than it harms the revealing party, then the two situations are similar. 
48 The richness of the above depiction will be fully revealed once any given feature of the disclosure 
regulation is analyzed separately. In this paper, however, we are interested in the characteristics of the 
entire system.
23
Note, that mandating disclosure on these grounds, if it is at all warranted, is a 
somewhat problematic solution, since it sacrifices the welfare of type “A” firms for the 
benefits of type “B” firms without proper compensations.  Aside from relevant 
distributive justice considerations, the mandatory disclosure requirement may depress 
investment in type A firms and distort market mechanisms.  As we shall see momentarily, 
the fact that comparison benefits also accrue when financial data is processed within the 
firm (the managerial accounting rationale), provides much stronger grounds for the 
mandatory nature of the federal disclosure system. 
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR MANDATORY DISCLOSURE WHEN FINANCIAL DATA IS 
PROCESSED WITHIN THE FIRM
  To understand why financial comparisons may still call for a mandatory 
securities regulation regime, we should move away from the domain of publicly held 
firms.  In a closely held firm, data is mainly processed by corporate insiders: the 
entrepreneurs, managers and the small community of shareholders.  Generally speaking, a 
closely held firm has no reason to make its financials public.  In the absence of public 
shareholders, private communication channels among the different stakeholders of the 
company may suffice.  Firms may find these channels more accommodating, since they 
do not expose business plans and secrets.49
Nevertheless, even in closely held firms, the managerial team (together with the 
shareholders) benefits from observing financial data of peer firms for at least two reasons; 
first, such comparisons help verify industry standards and assess whether deviation from 
49 And unlike the S.E.C. mandated disclosure, they are not strictly defined and may easily be 
customized to the special features of each firm. 
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industry standards are justified; and  second, the team can ascertain the extent to which 
the results of operations were affected by market climates, as reflected in the results of 
operations of other firms.
In contrast, however, to the situation considered in the previous section, in which 
data is processed within the firm, there is no element that renders disclosure externalities 
reciprocal.  To illustrate this point, let us assume, as before, that the costs of disclosure (at 
the optimal level for society and as mandated by the S.E.C. regulations for public firms) 
are 5, and the intrinsic benefits of disclosure are 4.  Assume further that each disclosing 
party confers a benefit of 3 on its peer, since the peer benefits from the ability to compare 
its own financial information with the disclosed information.  Most importantly, in a 
privately held firm, the analysis of financial data (including comparisons to other firms, if 
such comparisons are possible), is conducted within the firm by corporate insiders.  It is 
now possible to draw a matrix with these properties:
A
Disclose     Non-Disclose
B Disclose 2, 2 -1,3
Non-Disclose 3,-1  0,0
The salient difference between this scenario and the one considered previously is 
that comparison benefits accrue even to firms that elect not to disclose.  Each firm would 
therefore opt for the non-disclosure strategy regardless of the choice of its peer.  In this 
way, the observing party might gain comparison benefits without bearing the costs of 
making its own data public.  In other words, the non-disclosure strategy would be the 
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dominant strategy since it provides high benefits (3) if the other firm discloses, and incurs 
no costs (o) if the other firm refrains from disclosure.  Consequently, the southeast corner 
is the sole equilibrium of the game.  This inferior position is clearly socially and privately 
sub-optimal, since each firm could do much better by selecting the disclosure strategy.  
Apparent opportunism, however, would lead each of the firms to adopt the non-disclosure 
strategy, which ultimately would harm them both.
In the scenario delineated above, a mandatory disclosure requirement is 
warranted.  The net social benefits (4) and net private benefits for each of the affected 
firms (2) clearly outweigh those resulting from the firms’ voluntary decisions not to 
disclose (0).  The mandatory feature is a coordination mechanism to address a need  the 
market fails to address by itself.  Without it, as we see in practice, private firms might 
reject any commitment to disclose information, which would harm them all.
Once we recognize that private firms lack the proper incentives to reach the 
socially optimal disclosure levels, we should also recognize that a similar problem 
confronts public firms.  As discussed above, while a great deal of financial data of public 
firms is processed outside the firm, data analyses and comparisons to other firms are also 
conducted by corporate insiders.  Managerial accounting, the branch of accounting which 
managers draw on to assess the conduct of their firms, often uses comparisons to the 
information revealed by other firms.  The lack of proper incentives to reach the optimal 
disclosure levels that was shown to be pervasive in privately held firms also exists in 
public firms.  Since part of the data is processed within the firm, there is no reason to 
expose this internal data to gain the full benefits of the internal data. Consequently, it is 
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impossible to rely on public firms to voluntarily reach the disclosure levels that are 
optimal for society, and the mandatory feature of securities regulation may be justified.
This is especially true for the aspects of disclosure, which are highly important for 
the internal managerial team but are not as important for public shareholders.  To 
illustrate this point, let us assume that comparisons of the cash flow statement of a firm 
with the cash flow statements of its peers are essential for the internal management of the 
firm.  Assume further that the public shareholders do not put much emphasis on this 
particular statement.  Consequently, it is quite possible that without the mandatory 
requirement to include the cash-flow statement in the public financials, firms would not 
make their own cash flow statements public.  Exposure of financial data is costly for the 
firm, and while all firms would wish to review the statements of their peers, they would 
have no reason to expose their own cash flow statement.  Eventually, all firms might 
reject disclosure of the relevant financial statement, and no comparison benefits would 
accrue.  In such a case, a compelling obligation to disclose might bring relief to all of 
them.  Although no firm would elect to disclose its cash flow statement voluntarily, all 
firms would prefer the regime that makes disclosure obligatory.
V. THE ENIGMA OF THE BLUE SKY LAWS
The federal securities regulations have two separate disclosure requirements: one, 
disclosure to prospective shareholders prior to the sale of securities by the company to the 
public; and two, periodical continuous disclosure by public firms.  Prior to 1934, there 
were no federal securities disclosure requirements, but state laws, often termed Blue Sky 
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laws, did mandate minimal disclosure.50  Contrary to the federal regime, the Blue Sky 
Laws never had a continuous disclosure component and mainly required disclosure of 
financial information prior to the IPO.
The requirement to provide information prior to going public but not thereafter is 
puzzling.  Financial information is important throughout the life of the company.  Making 
the investment decision is only the starting point in the relationship between a company 
and its investors, and continuous disclosure allows monitoring and accurate pricing of the 
stock on the market.  If one cannot depend on investors to demand disclosure at the IPO, 
how can one rely on investors to demand continuous disclosure?  One can imagine that 
most rational investors would request and receive information when they consider 
making an investment.  Some unsophisticated investors, however, may fail to demand 
efficient periodical disclosure, since the benefits of such disclosure are more complex and 
difficult to understand.  It might, therefore, seem strange that the Blue Sky Laws 
demanded disclosure only prior to a public offering.
The importance of financial comparisons, highlighted by this paper, may explain 
this enigma.  We have discussed above comparisons among firms in the same industry. 
Aside from these important “horizontal” comparisons, analysts often also rely on 
“vertical” comparisons, i.e., comparisons of the financial reports of a single firm in 
different periods.  Once we appreciate the importance of theses inter-periodical 
comparisons, or the so-called time-series analysis,51 we recognize how disclosure 
benefits are fortified when market players have previous financial statements with which 
they can compare current financial reports.
50 For a case book description of the state regulation of securities (the Blue Sky Laws) see Larry D. 
Soderquist & Theresa A. Gabaldon, SECURITIES REGULATION (4th Ed. 1999) 660-70.
51 On the importance of time series analysis see Stickney & Weil, supra note 8, at 250.
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Some firms may decide not to disclose at all after considering  the total disclosure 
costs and benefits. If, however, they have already been compelled to report once, which 
consumes a great deal of fixed costs, they may voluntarily decide to continue to disclose 
in the future.  The disclosure in the subsequent period would not only provide the firm 
with intrinsic disclosure benefits, but also those of inter-period financial comparisons.  
To illustrate this point, let us assume that a firm may elect to disclose in either of two 
periods.  The costs of disclosure for every period are 8,52 and the benefits of disclosure 
are 6 in the first period, and 9 in the second period.  The enhanced disclosure value in the 
second period is due to inter-periodical financial comparisons. Consequently, without 
disclosure in the first period, the benefits of disclosure in the second period are merely 6.  
We can see that on a voluntarily basis the company would reject disclosure in both 
periods, since the costs of disclosure in any period and the combination of both periods 
are higher then the respective disclosure benefits.  If, however,  Blue Sky Laws required 
disclosure in the first period, then the company would voluntarily disclose its financials 
in the second period, at which time enhanced disclosure benefits outweigh disclosure 
costs.In actuality, many companies indeed published periodical financial reports prior to 
1933, when Blue Sky laws required merely to publish statements prior to going public.53
52 In order to isolate the argument we assume no fixed disclosure costs.
53
  See Ross L Watts & Jerold L. Zimmerman, Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: 
Some Evidence, 26 J. L. & ECON. 613 (1983); George Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: 
An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132 (1973).
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Some commentators have proposed that securities exchanges or state legislators 
replace the mandatory system of federal securities law.54  In such a system, firms could 
elect to be traded on the exchange (or alternatively incorporate in the state), which 
propose the most advantageous disclosure system.  A recent  study casts doubt on the 
efficacy of these suggestions.  On January 4, 1999, the duty to file with the S.E.C. was 
imposed on all firms traded on the OTC Bulletin Board, an electronic quotation medium 
operated by the National Association of Securities Dealers since 1990. Many of the OTC 
Bulletin Board firms which had not previously filed with the S.E.C., chose not to comply 
with the new requirement and left the OTC Bulletin Board.55  The firms removed from 
the OTC Bulletin Board were forced onto the Pink Sheets of the National Quotation 
Bureau, which is a sub-market that suffers from low liquidity.
By itself, this finding cannot support the mandatory nature of securities 
regulation.  The firms that did not comply with the new disclosure standards found them 
too costly to adopt. This may suggest that the new disclosure requirements were 
excessive, at least to these firms.  The study, however, also uncovered some hidden 
benefits of the mandated disclosure.  Interestingly, the researchers tracked OTC Bulletin 
Board firms which had already been filing with the S.E.C. prior to the new filing 
instruction -- almost half of the firms traded prior to the new regulation.  Those firms 
which did not change their disclosure practices have benefited from the new disclosure 
regulation, which has changed the disclosure practices of their peers; they have 
experienced a sustained increase in all liquidity measures together with a statistically 
54 See Romano, supra note 1; Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchanges as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV., 1453 
(1997).
55 Supra note 6, at 2.
30
significant increase in their share price.56  Presumably, the newly compliant firms (those 
which did not elect to leave the OTC Bulletin board) provided positive externalities to the 
already disclosing firms.
This evidence for significant externalities suggests that the mandatory nature of 
securities disclosure may be justified.  The firms which opted out of the OTC Bulletin 
Board could probably provide further benefits to their peer firms if they would be forced 
to disclose information -- whether or not they elect to trade on the Bulletin Board.57  If 
the analysis presented in this paper is accurate, the fact that firms elected not to comply 
with the new standards does not indicate that they would not do better if they were forced 
to comply.  As we have shown, it is quite possible that the decision not to disclose is the 
result of enjoying a free ride on the disclosure of others, without bearing the costs of 
disclosure.  Once firms are forced to disclose, free riding is not possible, and all firms 
share the benefits of disclosure while also bearing disclosure costs.
The paper also differentiated between two types of comparison benefits that flow 
from disclosure, and showed that the free ride should be more of a concern for 
comparison benefits used by corporate insiders.58  If it is possible to differentiate between 
disclosure components that interest corporate insiders and those that interest public 
shareholders, mandatory disclosure would best fit the former.
56 Supra note 6, at 3-4.
57 This argument should not be read though as promoting mandatory disclosure in these 
circumstances.  To reach a conclusion on this matter one would have to weigh the costs for the firms that 
evidently preferred not to disclose against the benefits of disclosure.
58
 Note that the juatification for mandatory disclosure when comparison benefits accrue within the 
boundaries of the firm fits many other types of inter-firm benefits associated with disclosure such as 
business data externalities, which can be enjoyed without reciprocal disclosure.  While this paper 
emphasizes on comparison spillovers, the social planner should consider all relevant externalities 
associated with disclosure.
